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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the
failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA)
negotiations which took place November 2003, the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known
for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that
uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as
the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering
political favors and goodwill through the financing of social
development projects, ALBA has created a political
environment whereby countries on the take and their
respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing
viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in
economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the
Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies.
To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides
Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba,
Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among
them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin
American country, Syria.
Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil
wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez
government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort
countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region
as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is
attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba
left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a
mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its
own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once
did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the
international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the
Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations,
and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the
region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation.
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Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez
has been spreading economic aid throughout the region,
funding several development projects. From stepping in to
buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to
helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica,
Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in
the region.
As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in
time and money in the Caribbean, providing development
assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis,
and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are
neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid
Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost.
It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM
community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15
members, leading experts and leaders in the region to
question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S.
Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on
the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued
Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of
Chávez to remain in power.
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INTRODUCTION
The means through which Venezuela is attempting to
position itself as the leader of the anti-U.S. ideological
agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean, ALBA, has
exerted significant influence in the region. Through the
provision of considerable economic assistance to member
and observer states, as well as other countries with ties to
Caracas, ALBA serves as a centerpiece of Bolivarian
Venezuela‟s foreign policy. The political ramifications
resulting from ALBA‟s aid could prove important in
influencing the Western Hemisphere‟s political map as
Venezuela‟s President Hugo Chávez continues his quest to
achieve greater leadership. However, the success of this
quest hinges in large part on Chávez‟s hold on power in
Venezuela, combined with the country‟s ability to sustain its
economic capability.
Currently comprised of eight member countries, ALBA has a
GDP of over $630 billion USD, and a total population
nearing 70 million as of April 2010. Working through this
alliance, Venezuela has pledged billions of dollars in
economic aid to countries such as Bolivia, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and St. Kitts and
Nevis, among others. Ranging from the financing of a
variety of social development projects, to preferential oil
prices for a variety of Caribbean island nations, these various
forms of assistance have enabled Venezuela to create an
alliance of support towards its foreign policy positions, or at
a minimum censor opposing viewpoints. Perceived by some
as “a vehicle for Venezuelan petro-diplomacy,” or a way for
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Caracas to “advance its economic and political interests,”
this „alliance‟ is both political and economic in nature.1
With Cuba‟s guidance, Venezuela has used ALBA to
establish itself in some aspects as the leader of the anti-U.S.
movement in the region.
VENEZUELA’S GEOPOLITICAL ASPIRATIONS
For oil-rich Venezuela, the practice of obtaining political
capital in exchange for economic assistance is not a new
concept. During the 1970s, Venezuela used its oil wealth to
pursue a foreign policy agenda aimed at carving a leadership
role in the region. Under President Carlos Andrés Perez
(1974-79), it helped create OPEC, allowing it to “punch
above its weight” after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, pivotal
moments in its foreign policy history. 2 Later, it went on to
sign the San José Oil Pact, under which Venezuela and
Mexico (also vying for influence in the region at the time)
supplied oil at preferential prices to 11 Caribbean countries,
as well as financing and technical expertise for infrastructure
projects.3 The difference this time is that, rather than
attempting to counterbalance Cuban influence as it did in the
past, now Venezuela utilizes ALBA primarily as a political
1

Christina DeFeo, “ALBA: How Much of a Turn to the Left in Latin
American Governance and Economic Policy?” Council on Hemispheric
Affairs Report, July 1, 2010.
http://www.truth-out.org/alba-how-much-a-turn-left-latin-americangovernance-and-economic-policy60974.
2
Harold A. Trinkunas, “What is Really New about Venezuela‟s
Bolivarian Foreign Policy?, Naval Postgraduate School Center on
Contemporary Policy, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 2, February
2006.
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2
006/Feb/trinkunasFeb06.html#references.
3
The San Jose Pact, also known as the San Jose Oil Facility Agreement,
was an agreement signed on August 3, 1980 in San Jose, Costa Rica, that
guaranteed Mexican and Venezuelan oil supplies under favorable
arrangements to several Central American and Caribbean countries.
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instrument that forms part of a concerted strategic effort to
counter U.S. influence in the region.
ALBA’S HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
Anti-U.S. from its inception
Since its founding, the organization‟s objectives have
consistently aimed at countering U.S. policy in Latin
America. ALBA, which means „dawn‟ in Spanish, was
initially proposed in 2001 by Chávez as a regional
alternative to U.S.-led free trade.4 Since the late 1990s, the
U.S. had been trying to establish a regional free trade
agreement with Latin American and Caribbean countries,
known as the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA). In
2001, under Chávez‟s leadership and with Cuba‟s guidance,
the ALBA was created as Latin America‟s answer to the
FTAA.5 As years passed however, it became evident that
while it was presented as an economic alliance, ALBA was
indeed a vehicle to further Chávez‟s political agenda.
Chávez and Cuba‟s Fidel Castro anchored this initiative,
originally entering into an accord in December 2004 and
committing to the exchange of medical/educational resources
and oil between the two countries.6 Since its creation,
ALBA‟s member and observer states, as well as other
supporting states, have gathered for summits on a frequent
basis. The 10th and most recent summit took place in June
(2010) in Ecuador, the previous nine have taken place in
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Alex Newman, “Leftist Regimes Agree to New Currency,” The New
American, October 20, 2009.
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/southamerica-mainmenu-37/2123-leftist-regimes-agree-to-new-currency.
5
James Roberts, “If the Real Simon Bolivar Met Hugo Chavez, He‟d See
Red,” The Heritage Foundation, August 20, 2007.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/08/if-the-real-simoacutenboliacutevar-met-hugo-chaacutevez-hed-see-red.
6
Christina DeFeo, opp.cit. July 1, 2010.
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Cuba and Venezuela, with the exception of the 7th which also
took place in Ecuador.
Main Components
ALBA is comprised of several components such as a
proposed regional currency, a regional bank, and its own
media outlet. Each component was established with an
individual purpose, yet all sharing one thing in common:
attempting to be an alternative to a U.S. led mechanism. The
SUCRE (Spanish acronym for Unified System for the
Regional Compensation of Payments), the currency
introduced by ALBA, aims to eventually operate as a hard
currency, but currently does so only in virtual form for
electronic transactions.7
The Bank of ALBA, which claims to have over $1 billion in
capital, makes loans available for states to undertake
infrastructural, health, education, and social developments.
Established in 2008, the Bank was deemed by Chávez as an
alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank, describing it as “a political instrument for
social and economic development which breaks with
capitalist concepts.”8 Unlike the World Bank or the IMF, the
Bank of ALBA does not impose loan conditions and
functions based on consensus of all members, with a rotating
presidency of the member nations.9 While its long-term
success looms as a big question mark, the Bank of ALBA is
yet another example of Venezuela‟s attempt to provide an

7

Alex Newman, opp. cit. October 20, 2009.
Kiraz Janicke, “$1 billion for Bank of ALBA - Anti Capitalist
Banking,” Venezuela Analysis, January 27, 2008. (Venezuelanalysis.com
is an independent website produced by individuals who dedicated to
disseminating news and analysis about the current political situation in
Venezuela.)
http://www.zimbio.com/President+Hugo+Chávez/articles/169/1+billion+
Bank+ALBA+Anti+Capitalist+Banking.
9
Ibid.
8
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alternative international financial institution for its member
and observer states.
Venezuela also launched TeleSUR, a TV channel created in
2005 which broadcasts throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean. According to Chávez, this media initiative aims
at providing an alternative to what he calls a conspiracy by
international and local commercial networks to silence and
distort news from Latin America.10 With correspondents and
news collaborators throughout the region, as well as in
Washington, D.C., New York, London, and Spain, it
broadcasts free of charge 24 hours a day via cable, satellite
and Internet covering Latin America and the Caribbean, the
U.S., Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.11
In 2008, Chávez also suggested ALBA members "should set
up a joint defense strategy, and integrate our armed forces
and intelligence services because the enemy is the same: the
United States empire."12 Despite little if no progress to this
call, this does not seem to present a threat to U.S. hegemony
in this area, but the idea could become a controversial issue
if it ever became a requirement for a member state since
levels of commitment to ALBA‟s vision vary.

10

Pascal Fletcher,"Chavez TV Channel Aims to be Latin American
Voice,” Reuters, (Caracas, Venezuela: 12 April 12 2005).
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_
all&address=102x1390772.
11
Hector Escalante Fuente, “TeleSUR celebra cinco años de transmisión
informativa en Latinoamérica,” TeleSUR, July 24, 2010.
http://www.albatv.org/TeleSUR-celebra-cinco-anos-de.html.
12
Nikolas Kozloff, “Hugo Chávez's Anti-Imperialist Army,” Venezuela
Analysis, February 19, 2008. (Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent
website produced by individuals who dedicated to disseminating news
and analysis about the current political situation in Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3177.
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Member Countries
First launched with only two member countries, Cuba and
Venezuela, today eight member countries comprise ALBA
and all are signatories to its People‟s Trade Agreement.
Bolivia, led by Evo Morales became the third member state
in April 2006. Daniel Ortega‟s Nicaragua joined in January
2007; Dominica in January 2008; Ecuador in June 2009 once
Rafael Correa became President; Antigua and Barbuda and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also joined in June 2009,
bringing its total members to eight. Four other countries in
the hemisphere are ALBA observer states, permitted to
attend regional conferences and with plans to become full
members in the future: Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay and
Uruguay.13 Honduras had at one point intended to join while
President Manuel Zelaya was still in power, but its Congress
withdrew from doing so in January 2010, after he was
ousted.14
SPREADING ECONOMIC AID
While Venezuela‟s main motivation for the creation of
ALBA is mainly political and ideological, its leverage with
the countries that participate in this alliance is its ability to
provide economic assistance.
Many countries main
motivation in being associated with ALBA is primarily
driven by the economic benefits they can obtain from
Venezuela. Nevertheless, the global financial crisis which
strongly impacted the Venezuela economy raises the
question of whether Venezuela can eventually honor its
much publicized pledges; that remains to be seen as part of
13

Christina DeFeo, opp.cit. July 1, 2010.
James Suggett, “Honduras Withdraws from ALBA, El Salvador Won‟t
Join Despite FMLN Support,” Venezuela Analysis, January 15, 2010.
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website produced by
individuals who dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the
current political situation in Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5070.
14
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its promised aid has been slow to materialize. Exact numbers
on the funding and assistance that Venezuela has provided
are difficult to find, however, press reports and other expert
sources have provided some insight.
Venezuela has come to the assistance of ALBA countries
when in need. For example, when the U.S. stopped buying
Bolivia‟s soy beans in 2006, Cuba and Venezuela began
importing them under ALBA. ALBA has also assisted
Bolivia upgrade its natural gas sector and Cuba has deployed
doctors and teachers to Bolivia.15 Venezuela has also
provided assistance to Bolivia‟s army, cattle ranches,
microfinance projects and urban sanitation companies.16
Nicaragua, since Daniel Ortega took control of the
government again in 2007, has received an estimated $250
million in aid from Venezuela in 2010 and about $125
million during 2008 and 2009.17 In Ecuador, Venezuela is
involved in a joint oil refinery construction project known as
the Pacific Petrochemical Complex.18 ALBA, or Venezuela
has also supported Paraguay, an observer state, whose
leadership has maintained good relations with Caracas. With
no proven petroleum reserves and a dependency on imports
15

Larry Birns and Adrienne Nothnagel, “Cuba Comes in From the Cold,”
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 31, 2006.
http://www.coha.org/cuba-comes-in-from-the-cold/.
16
Simon Romero, “Venezuela Rivals U.S. in aid to Bolivia,” New York
Times, February 23, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/americas/23bolivia.html?_r=
3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print.
17
Victor Hugo Tinoco, “Corruption Is the Most Serious Aspect of The
Ortega-Chávez Relationship,” Revista Envío, Number 338, September
2009. (Revista Envío is a monthly magazine providing analysis on
Central America, based out of Managua, Nicaragua.)
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4061.
18
Steven Matther, Venezuela Pays for First ALBA Trade with Ecuadort
in New Regional Currency,” Venezuela Analysis, July 7, 2010.
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website produced by
individuals who dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the
current political situation in Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5480.
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for domestic oil consumption, Paraguay received Chávez‟s
pledge of millions of dollars in aid and needed professionals
to help it explore reserves.19 Uruguay, an observer state, has
also received considerable economic assistance through
ALBA. In addition to receiving an estimated 40,000
barrels/day of oil at discounted prices, it has also obtained
financing to expand an existing refinery and the needed
crude oil to run it.20
Focus on the Caribbean
As it has done historically, Venezuela continues to look to
the Caribbean as its strategic area of influence. In spite of the
U.S. being the main economic partner in the region and
maintaining good political relations, Venezuela offers an
alternative source of economic assistance. Through ALBA,
Venezuela supplies oil to St. Kitts and Nevis, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic at discounted prices; Haiti is only an
observer state and neither the Dominican Republic nor St.
Kitts and Nevis are member or observer states of ALBA, yet
are permitted to pay their oil bills to Venezuela in barter for
agricultural products, such as bananas or sugar.21 For
Dominica, Venezuela has offered to modernize its
international airport, granting it $8.7 million USD and
providing an additional $80 million USD to build an oil
refinery, and the required crude oil to run it. Venezuela has

19

Stratfor, “Venezuela: The price of Paraguay” (18 August 2008).
http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/122287/analysis/venezuela_prize_
paraguay.
20
Associated Press, “Uruguay's new leader strengthens ties with
Chavez,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 7 April 2010).
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Uruguays-new-leader-apf1773004816.html?x=0&.v=1
21
Shawn Hattingh, “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neoliberalism,” Venezuela Analysis, February 13, 2008.
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3154.
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also granted Dominica an additional $4.4 million USD to
support its agricultural sector.22 In Antigua and Barbuda, it
committed $8 million for the financing of a water
infrastructure project, and for the reduction of pensioners‟
utilities and educational scholarships.23 For St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, it has pledged a $50 million low interest
loan.24
Leadership also entails coming to the aide of countries
during natural disasters. To that end, Venezuela has also
positioned itself as a donor country. In the wake of Haiti‟s
devastating earthquake, Venezuela pledged $2.4 billion to
relief efforts, more than the U.S. ($1.2 billion), the European
Union ($1.7 billion) and the World Bank ($399 million), and
was the first to respond, landing a military plane loaded with
food and Haitian medical students.25 Additionally, it forgave
Haiti‟s $395 million foreign debt owed to Venezuela under
a subsidized fuel program.26
Aid May Cause Possible Rifts in CARICOM
The economic assistance provided by Venezuela to various
Caribbean nations may be causing rifts within CARICOM.
Chávez is inviting support from Caribbean countries with
strong economic ties to the US through subsidized oil and
22

Latin America Monitor, Dominica Joins ALBA, February 2008.
http://www.latinamericamonitor.com/file/52318/dominica-joinsalba.html.
23
Stabroek News, “Antigua formalizes ALBA participation,”
(Georgetown, Guyana: 28 June 2009)
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/news/stories/06/28/antiguaformalizes-alba-participation/.
24
Karl Eklund, “Gonzalves on ALBA,” St Vincent and the Grenadines
Blogspot, April 13, 2010.
http://svgblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/gonsalves-on-alba.html.
25
Jim Wyss, “Venezuela major donor of assistance to Haiti,” The Miami
Herald, July 5, 2010.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/05/1716791/venezuela-majordonor-of-assistance.html.
26
Ibid.
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aid that may in some cases surpass assistance offered by the
U.S.27 While it can be argued that Venezuela has fallen short
in bringing all CARICOM nations under the ALBA umbrella
(six of the 15 CARICOM states have forged closer ties with
Venezuela), some regional leaders like Jamaica‟s Prime
Minister Bruce Golding have questioned whether
CARICOM will continue behaving as a bloc in the
international arena, pointing out that ALBA‟s political
implications can cause a rift within the CARICOM
community.28 He stated that perhaps the involvement of
CARICOM states in ALBA is nothing more than the pursuit
of “opportunities for individual short-term economic benefits
even if the pursuit of these opportunities diverges from the
commitment to joint CARICOM policies and actions.” 29
Although ideology may not be at its center, the economy is.
Given Venezuela‟s history of engagement in the Caribbean
and ALBA‟s political agenda, the question remains whether
in pursuing these opportunities during tough economic times,
CARICOM as a bloc might be weakened to the point of
endangerment.
York College Professor, Ivelaw Griffith, denotes the issue of
sustainability. Continued economic support for the region
hinges on Chávez's remaining in power and the health of
Venezuela‟s economy, which is not as strong as it once was.
He also sees a potential rift in CARICOM with regard to
territorial disputes, particularly noting the one between
Guyana and Venezuela. Although Guyana has historically
counted on full CARICOM support on this issue in
27

Brian Ellsworth, opp. cit. 2 September 2008.
Antigua Observer, “UNDESIRED CONSEQUENCES: Golding says
CARICOM under threat,” (Kingston, Jamaica: 10 June 2009).
http://www.antiguaobserver.com/?p=1336.
29
Antillean, “CARICOM disjointed again, this time over ALBA,”
(Barbados: 27 April 2009).
http://www.antillean.org/2009/04/27/caricom-disjointed-again-this-timeover-alba/.
28
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theinternational arena, Dr. Griffith argues it remains to be
seen when the issue surfaces again whether positions will
shift given Venezuela‟s influence on ALBA-associated
Caribbean nations. Finally, he points out that despite
Venezuela‟s outpouring of aid to the Caribbean, the fact
remains the U.S. is more of a direct foreign investor in the
region, particularly in areas related to trade and tourism.
However, as Sir Ronald Sanders, former Caribbean
Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the World Trade
Organization, underscores, “since the end of the Cold
War, U.S. official development assistance to CARICOM
countries has dwindled and has focused more on issues of
concern to the U.S. such as the interdiction of drug
traffickers; port and airport security as part of the U.S. war
on terror; and illegal migration.” 30 In effect, the U.S.‟s
diminishing assistance may lead the island-nations to closer
relations with ALBA members.
MECHANISM FOR PROMOTING FOREIGN POLICY
Stepping into Cuba’s Foreign Policy Shoes
The proactive involvement in regional hemispheric issues by
Venezuela during this past decade has made Chávez a
reference to the anti-American socialist camp in Latin
America and the Caribbean. His new role in the foreign
policy arena is an attempt by Venezuela to assume the
leadership exerted by Cuba in the region for approximately
three decades, starting in the 1960‟s, and take over where it
left off over 10 years ago. The ideology remains consistent,
based on a strong anti-U.S., anti-imperialism tone. In fact, it
can be argued ALBA resembles OSPAAL (Organization of
Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin
America), a mechanism used by Cuba to coordinate
liberation movements around the world united by their antiU.S. agenda. Cuba lost its resources when the Soviet Union
disintegrated in 1991, but preserved the blueprint which it
30

Sir Ronald Sanders, opp.cit. April 17, 2007.
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has re-used in acting as a key advisor to the government in
Caracas. The ideological approach is consistent, but the
difference is that Venezuela relies on its own resources,
rather than those of a superpower patron. Thus, Venezuela
seeks to coalesce a regional foreign policy through economic
assistance, traditionally a role of the U.S., Europe or the
former Soviet Union.
Led by Venezuela, ALBA countries have begun to exert
themselves as a voting bloc in the OAS where debates on the
hemispheric political situation are played out. Having
recently issued a joint country statement where it told the
OAS to stay out of Venezuela‟s affairs, ALBA has not been
shy to flex the muscle it has built with its member and
observer states, as well as other non-member supporting
states.31 This has provided Chávez with an alliance capable
of challenging U.S. positions, while simultaneously moving
its own policies forward in that international body.
Additionally, the ALBA alliance represents a solid voting
bloc in the Latin American and Caribbean group at the UN,
which can potentially vote for Chávez‟s policies in that
body.32
Urge to act on the world stage
While the core of Venezuela‟s foreign policy deals primarily
with Latin American affairs, Chávez has shown his urge to
be a player on the world stage. A vocal advocate of positions
contrary to the U.S., through ALBA, Chávez has recognized
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the
former Soviet Republic of Georgia; managed to obtain
enough votes to block the final binding agreement on the
31

BBC Caribbean News Service, “ALBA tells OAS to stay out of
Venezuela‟s internal affairs,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 21 February 2011)
http://rjrnewsonline.com/news/regional/alba-tells-oas-stay-outvenezuelas-internal-affairs
32
Danielle de Bruin, “The Chavez ALBA Initiative is the dawn of
trouble for the Americas,” The Henry Jackson Society, June 13, 2008.
http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=688
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Copenhagen Accord in 2009; and has been a strong
supporter of Iran‟s nuclear ambitions. These are examples of
Venezuela‟s debut on issues of a more global nature.
Chávez has also extended ALBA observer state status to a
country outside the Americas, listed on the State Sponsors of
Terrorism list. During an official October (2010) two-day
visit to Syria to bolster bilateral relations, an agreement was
reached to build a refinery with a 140,000 oil barrel capacity
in that country, with the joint investment of Iran and
Malaysia.33 Following the trip, Syrian President Bashar alAssad and Chávez signed an act of integration for Syria to
become an observing nation of ALBA.34 Clearly not a
country geographically situated in ALBA‟s realm, this move
is an example of Chávez‟s desire to forge closer ties with
countries traditionally on opposing sides from the U.S.
CONCLUSION
From its creation, ALBA has functioned as a political
vehicle through which Venezuela has taken the baton from
Cuba as the anti-U.S. ideology-driven leader in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The political ramifications of
this regional alliance have already been noted by leaders and
experts in the region alike, who have suggested Venezuela is
attempting to influence the Western Hemisphere‟s political
map. To that end, Chávez has used ALBA as an economic
tool for political ends that oppose U.S. interests in the region.
Some experts believe ALBA has not brought many tangible
political benefits to Chávez. 35 Nonetheless, as part of his

39

Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Venezuela and Syria: "The CaracasDamascus Axis",” The Hudson New York, November 29, 2010.
http://americas-forum.com/content/venezuela-and-syria-caracasdamascus-axis.
40
Ibid.
35
James Roberts, opp.cit. August 20, 2007.
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regional strategy to provide billions in aid, Chávez‟s
particular attention to CARICOM nations, has put these
states in a position where they may find themselves at odds
in the near future with their sister-states in key foreign policy
positions. The question remains whether Venezuela will
continue to rise as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the
region and beyond. Critics argue ALBA‟s future does not
appear to be sustainable. “Venezuela faces one of the highest
inflation rates in the world, alongside recurring food
shortages, infrastructure problems, housing shortages, and
increased crime and corruption,” argues Jodie Neary.36
Additionally, it has accumulated $20 billion in debt to China
alone.37 Because of its close link to the Venezuelan
economy, the very success of ALBA is dependent on
continued oil sales at stable prices and Chávez ability to stay
in power.
Having forged an alliance among countries rich in energy
resources (oil and hydrocarbons), metals and agricultural
land, ALBA has the potential to weigh-in on debates taking
place in multilateral settings related to Latin American
affairs. Venezuela offers “generous handouts in its foreign
policy, peppered with a pro-poor, distributionist discourse.”38
However, Chávez‟s use of “social spending to create or
promote political clones abroad, not just a diplomatic shield

36

Jodie Neary, “Venezuela's ALBA in the face of the Global Economic
Crisis,” Upside Down World, December 29, 2008
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/1642venezuelas-alba-in-the-face-of-the-global-economic-crisis-.
37
Corina Rodriguez Pons and Daniel Cancel, “Venezuela Depleted
Savings Amid Oil Revenue Plunge,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 29,
2010. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/venezueladepleted-savings-amid-oil-revenue-plunge-update1-.html.
38
Javier Corrales, “Venezuela‟s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy:
Current Trends,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 17, 2008.
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cor071708.pdf.
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abroad, causes him to suffer diplomatic setbacks.”39 Because
he often promises more than he delivers, he disappoints
many of the politicians he is trying to court. Despite this,
Venezuela has not only picked up where Cuba left off over
10 years ago, but has perhaps already gone a few steps
further in its quest.
ALBA‟s use of social policy as a primary foreign policy tool
has in fact brought Venezuela some rewards, allowing
Chávez to win two types of allies: states that refuse to
criticize him, and intellectuals on the left, especially in
Europe.40 As Professor Javier Corrales argues, “Chávez‟s
social power foreign policy has produced for Venezuela an
impressive shield against international criticism even by
those who know better, and a reputation for humanitarianism
among those who are less informed. This is a significant
foreign policy accomplishment.”41 Yet, many questions
remain unanswered as to the long-term viability of ALBA,
its ability to recruit more countries, and its role in continuing
to further Venezuela‟s foreign policy.

39
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41
Ibid.
40

17

WORKS CITED
Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Venezuela and Syria: "The
Caracas-Damascus Axis",” The Hudson New York,
November 29, 2010.
http://americas-forum.com/content/venezuela-andsyria-caracas-damascus-axis.
Antigua Observer, “UNDESIRED CONSEQUENCES:
Golding says CARICOM under threat,” (Kingston,
Jamaica: 10 June 2009).
http://www.antiguaobserver.com/?p=1336.
Antillean, “CARICOM disjointed again, this time over
ALBA,”
(Barbados:
27
April
2009).
http://www.antillean.org/2009/04/27/caricomdisjointed-again-this-time-over-alba/.
Associated Press, “Uruguay's new leader strengthens ties
with Chavez,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 7 April 2010).
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Uruguays-new-leaderapf-1773004816.html?x=0&.v=1.
BBC Caribbean News Service, “ALBA tells OAS to stay out
of Venezuela‟s internal affairs,” (Caracas, Venezuela:
21 February 2011).
http://rjrnewsonline.com/news/regional/alba-tellsoas-stay-out-venezuelas-internal-affairs.
Brian Ellsworth, “Venezuela rivals U.S. in Central America
and Caribbean,” Reuters, (Caracas, Venezuela: 2
September 2008).
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/02/uk-enezuelausa-idUKN0240396720080902?pageNumber=1.

18

Christina DeFeo, “ALBA: How Much of a Turn to the Left
in Latin American Governance and Economic
Policy?” Council on Hemispheric Affairs Report, July
1, 2010.
http://www.truth-out.org/alba-how-much-a-turn-leftlatin-american-governance-and-economicpolicy60974.
Corina Rodriguez Pons and Daniel Cancel, “Venezuela
Depleted Savings Amid Oil Revenue Plunge,”
Bloomberg Business Week, April 29, 2010.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-0429/venezuela-depleted-savings-amid-oil-revenueplunge-update1-.html.
Danielle de Bruin, “The Chavez ALBA Initiative is the dawn
of trouble for the Americas,” The Henry Jackson
Society, June 13, 2008.
http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=6
88.
Daniel Helft and Alex Kennedy, “Venezuela to Buy $150
Million of Argentine Bonds,” Bloomberg, May 11,
2005.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarch
ive&sid=adRMkeQztp88&refer=news_index.
Harold A. Trinkunas, “What is Really New about
Venezuela‟s Bolivarian Foreign Policy?, Naval
Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary
Policy, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 2,
February 2006.
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publicatio
ns/OnlineJournal/2006/Feb/trinkunasFeb06.html#refe
rences.

19

Hector Escalante Fuente, “TeleSUR celebra cinco años de
transmisión
informativa
en
Latinoamérica,”
TeleSUR, July 24, 2010.
http://www.albatv.org/TeleSUR-celebra-cinco-anosde.html.
James Roberts, “If the Real Simon Bolivar Met Hugo
Chavez, He‟d See Red,” The Heritage Foundation,
August 20, 2007.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/08/ifthe-real-simoacuten-boliacutevar-met-hugochaacutevez-hed-see-red.
James Suggett, “Honduras Withdraws from ALBA, El
Salvador Won‟t Join Despite FMLN Support,”
Venezuela
Analysis,
January
15,
2010.
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website
produced by individuals who dedicated to
disseminating news and analysis about the current
political situation in Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5070.
Javier Corrales, “Venezuela‟s Domestic Politics and Foreign
Policy: Current Trends,” Testimony before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, July 17, 2008.
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cor071708.pdf.
Jim Wyss, “Venezuela major donor of assistance to Haiti,”
The Miami Herald, July 5, 2010.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/05/1716791/v
enezuela-major-donor-of-assistance.html.

20

Jodie Neary, “Venezuela‟s ALBA in the face of the Global
Economic Crisis,” Upside Down World, December
29, 2008.
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuelaarchives-35/1642-venezuelas-alba-in-the-face-of-theglobal-economic-crisis-.
Karl Eklund, “Gonzalves on ALBA,” St Vincent and the
Grenadines Blogspot, April 13, 2010.
http://svgblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/gonsalves-onalba.html.
Kiraz Janicke, “$1 billion for Bank of ALBA - Anti
Capitalist Banking,” Venezuela Analysis, January 27,
2008. (Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent
website produced by individuals who dedicated to
disseminating news and analysis about the current
political situation in Venezuela.)
Larry Birns and Adrienne Nothnagel, “Cuba Comes in From
the Cold,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 31,
2006.
http://www.coha.org/cuba-comes-in-from-the-cold/.
Latin America Monitor, Dominica Joins ALBA, February
2008.
http://www.latinamericamonitor.com/file/52318/domi
nica-joins-alba.html.
Nikolas Kozloff, “Hugo Chávez's Anti-Imperialist Army,”
Venezuela
Analysis,
February
19,
2008.
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website
produced by individuals who dedicated to
disseminating news and analysis about the current
political situation in Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3177.

21

Pascal Fletcher," Chavez TV Channel Aims to be Latin
American Voice,” Reuters, (Caracas, Venezuela: 12
April 12 2005).
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/dub
oard.php?az=view_all&address=102x1390772
Shawn Hattingh, “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to
Neo-liberalism,” Venezuela Analysis, February 13,
2008. http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3154
Simon Romero, “Venezuela Rivals U.S. in aid to Bolivia,”
New York Times, February 23, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/americas/
23bolivia.html?_r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
Sir Ronald Sanders, “Expanding its sphere of influence:
Venezuela in the Caribbean,” Caribbean-Britain
Business Council Seminar Series, April 17, 2007.
http://da-academy.org/Venezuela_Caricom.pdf
Stabroek News, “Antigua formalizes ALBA participation,”
(Georgetown, Guyana: 28 June 2009)
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/news/stories/06/
28/antigua-formalizes-alba-participation/
Steven Matther, Venezuela Pays for First ALBA Trade with
Ecuador in New Regional Currency,” Venezuela
Analysis, July 7, 2010. (Venezuelanalysis.com is an
independent website produced by individuals who
dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about
the current political situation in Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5480

22

Tim Anderson, “Breaking Imperial Ties: Venezuela and
ALBA,” Venezuela Analysis, March 27, 2006.
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website
produced by individuals who dedicated to
disseminating news and analysis about the current
political
situation
in
Venezuela.)
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1675
Victor Hugo Tinoco, “Corruption Is the Most Serious Aspect
of The Ortega-Chávez Relationship,” Revista Envío,
Number 338, September 2009.
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4061

23

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Erich de la Fuente is a Research Scientist at ARC/FIU. He
is an expert on strategic communications and public affairs,
counseling organizations operating in the U.S., Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet
Republics. Mr. de la Fuente has led proactive international
public awareness campaigns, developed crisis management
plans and designed comprehensive communication strategies
and internal communications programs for a variety of
clients around the world. He has also been a lead
communications consultant for a variety of anti-corruption,
good governance and rule-of-law projects in various
countries around the world, including Armenia, Georgia,
Ukraine, Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, Jordan, and
Rwanda.
Mr. de la Fuente holds a Master‟s in Latin
American
Studies
from
Georgetown
University
(Washington, D.C.) and a Bachelor‟s Degree in International
Relations from Florida International University (Miami, FL).
Mr. de la Fuente is fluent in English, Spanish, Portuguese
and Italian, and proficient in Russian.

24

WHEMSAC PUBLICATIONS
PHASE II
Norman Munroe, “Climate Change and Regions at Risk: A
Look at Central America.” May 2011.
Juan Pablo Sarmiento & Gabriela Hoberman, “Disaster Risk
Management Disparity in the Caribbean: Evidence from
Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago.” May 2011.
Daniel E. Moreno, “The Indigenous in Plurinational Bolivia:
Perceptions of Indigenous People in Bolivia Before and
During the Morales Government.” April 2011.
Raúl L. Madrid, “Indigenous Movements, Democracy, and
U.S. Interests in Latin America.” April 2011.
Thomas Bruneau, “An Analysis of the Implications of Joint
Military Structures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia.” April 2011.
Rut Diamint, Pablo Policzer and Michael Shifter, “Latin
American Coups: Have They Vanished or Taken New
Shapes?” March 2011.
Antonio L. Mazzitelli, “The New Transatlantic Bonanza:
Cocaine on Highway 10.” March 2011.
Carlos Pereira, “Brazil Under Dilma Rousseff: Similar
Policy Directions Maintained.” March 2011.
Patricio Navia, “Venezuela and Chile: Two opposite Paths of
Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development.”
March 2011.
Miguel L. Castillo-Girón, “Land Ownership Transfers in
Petén, Guatemala.” February 2011.
25

ARC, “Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and
Beyond.” February 2011.
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditures: Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.” December 2010.
Bradley S. Porter, “Altered Landscapes or Arms Race?
Making Sense of Military Spending in South America.”
November 2010.
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditure: Andean and
Amazon Regions.” November 2010.
Ambassador Peter DeShazo, “Consolidating Security and
Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama.”
November 2010.
Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “South American Defense
Council: What it means for regional security?” November
2010.
Erich de la Fuente, “Cuba‟s Role in Venezuela‟s Control of
the Internet and Online Social Networks.” October 2010.
Marifeli Perez-Stable, “Raul Castro‟s Government: Recent
Economic Reforms and Some Political Considerations.”
October 2010.
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditures: Central
America and Dominican Republic.” September 2010.
Hal Brands, “Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America:
Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed
Spaces.” September 2010.
ARC, „‟Honduras‟ Stressed Social Fabric: Instability and
Risks.” August 2010.
26

CTC and ARC, „‟Uranium in Latin America: Reserves,
Energy, and Security Implications.” August 2010.
Kristina Mani, „‟Military Entrepreneurship in Latin America:
A Brief Overview.” June 2010.
John Proni, “Independent Monitoring of the Cuban
Economic Zone Oil Development.” July 2010.
Bruce Bagley and Olga Nazario, “Lithium and Bolivia: The
Promise and the Problems.” June 2010.
Brian Fonseca, “Domestic Politics in the Dominican
Republic after the Earthquake in Haiti.” June 2010.
PHASE I
Brian Fonseca, “Human Smuggling & The TerroristCriminal Nexus.” January 2009.
Arturo Contreras and Francisco Ledantec, “General
Overview of Transnational Threats in Latin America with a
Special Focus in South America & Its Effect on International
Security and US-Latin American Relations.” December
2008.
Thomas Bruneau, “Civil Military Relations in Democratic
Latin America.” December 2008.
Brian Fonseca, “Identifying Opportunities for US-Cuba
Military Cooperation.” December 2008.
Harold A. Trinkunas, “Understanding Venezuelan Strategic
Culture.” December 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “US-Brazil: Forging a New Relationship.”
November 2008.
27

Joanna Mateo, “Las Maras in Honduras.” November 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Advancing Security Cooperation in the
Americas: An Historical Perspective.” August 2008.
Julio A. Cirino, “The Media Component in a Visual Culture
and the Spread of Populism in Latin America: Exploring the
Spiral of Silence.” June 2008.
Brian Fonseca and Evan Ellis, “Emerging Relationships:
China and Latin America.” May 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Gang Violence in Central America: The
Case of Honduras. Identifying a Role for USSOUTHCOM.”
April 2008.
Anthony P. Maingot, “The New Geopolitics of the Andes:
The Dangers of a State-on-State War.” April 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Health Threats to Stability in the Americas.”
February 2008.
Brian Fonseca, “Emerging Relationships: Iran & Latin
America.” February 2008.
Brian Fonseca, “Energy Outlook: Brazil.” January 2008.

28

NOTES:
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
29

NOTES:
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
30

NOTES:
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
31

